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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506  
August 5, 1995

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MEMORANDUM FOR

(19)

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the United States  
to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON  
Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. AARON WILLIAMS  
Executive Secretary  
United States Agency for  
International Development

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for Review and Comment -- "Towards a  
Long-Term Solution to Rwanda-Burundi Problem"

Please provide NSC your agency's comments on the attached  
discussion paper by noon Tuesday, August 8..

Nancy Soderberg, Deputy National Security Advisor, will chair an  
ad hoc meeting to discuss this paper on Wednesday, August 9, at 1  
p.m. in the White House Situation Room. The NSC will contact  
agencies separately to discuss participation.

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Discussion Paper

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS  
DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAR 2009 200103014

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**DISCUSSION PAPER**

**Towards a Long-Term Solution to the Rwanda-Burundi Problem  
August 1995**

**Recent Developments**

Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi have been engaged in a generations' old struggle for political and economic power. This power struggle is aggravated by ethnic fear and animosity and has resulted in recurrent waves of genocide in both countries. In recent years, these genocides seem to be growing more frequent and more horrible. Consequently, the region is highly unstable. Refugee populations and cross-border military alliances seriously threaten the stability of Rwanda/Burundi as well as that of neighboring Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda. The current refugee populations in Zaire and Tanzania are unsustainable both for the host countries and the international community. The potential for renewed ethnic conflict is high in both Rwanda and Burundi.

The fact of recurrent genocide in Central Africa, coupled with events in the former Yugoslavia, seriously erodes the already frayed normative fabric that binds the international community and upon which its institutions are premised.

**U.S. Policy to Date**

American policy toward Rwanda and Burundi have been concentrated in six principal areas.

1. **Facilitate Refugee Return and National Reconciliation:** Our relations and assistance to Rwanda and Burundi depend on serious efforts by the two governments to create conditions that will promote refugee return, internal recovery and national reconciliation.
2. **Maintain Stability and Build Confidence:** The U.S. has provided logistical support to expedite deployment to Rwanda of an expanded contingent of UN peacekeepers last year. We also supported a drawdown in the force level in June as commensurate with needs. We endorse the activities of the Organization of African Unity in Burundi and the deployment of human rights monitors.
3. **Ensure Accountability for the Genocide:** The U.S. co-sponsored the UN Security Council Resolution which authorizes a Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal and has sent teams to assist the investigation.
4. **Promote Respect for Human Rights:** We have told Rwandan government leaders of our concerns over the reports of revenge killings. The Government has stated that reprisals are against its policy and that it will cooperate with UN authorities to investigate any incidents. We have also pressed the Burundian government to respect the basic human rights of its citizens.
5. **Enhance Security in Refugee Camps:** Host countries have principal responsibility for assuring security, and the international community is working to assist the neighboring states in carrying out this responsibility.

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6. **Coordinate and Mobilize the International Community:** The United States established a "Friends of Rwanda" operational support group, composed of 11 key countries, the UN, the OAU and EU to coordinate and push efforts on refugee repatriation and camp security, the International Tribunal, human rights monitors, aid for rehabilitation and other issues.

### Policy Options

**General Assessment:** While our policy to date has been successful in addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis, Burundi, and to a lesser degree Rwanda, live on the precipice of anarchy. Maximized ethnic tensions, two-million refugees and a pervasive sense of hopelessness make the status-quo unacceptable. It is imperative that discussions occur on comprehensive long-term planning.

### **Key Assumptions:**

- Lasting political and ethnic reconciliation is unlikely in the short term in either country and may never be possible.
- The United States is not prepared to intervene militarily with its own forces.
- Short of using force, the United States is prepared to take additional steps it deems both necessary and practical to avert an imminent crisis and prevent recurrent crises in the future.
- Any long-term solution will require aggressive, cooperative efforts among donor nations and among states in the region. The U.S. must lead the effort (since no one else will) and devote substantial, high-level energy to the task. We should anticipate that this problem will require sustained, high level attention if we are to have a meaningful chance of success.

**Option #1:** The following approach, although difficult to implement, may help avert another crisis in Rwanda and place Rwanda on a more secure footing over the long-run:

a) **Lift arms embargo with conditions to deter arms transfers to Burundi.** The Rwandan representative to the UN has requested its lifting. Conditions would include verifiable mechanism to preclude arms transfer to Burundi and ex-FAR and militias in Rwanda and Zaire. Rwandan government has already indicated its willingness to try and meet such conditions.

### **PROS**

- Allows GOR to defend against attack from rearmed ex-FAR.
- Demonstrates international support for GOR.
- Helps establish Rwanda as a stable and viable state.

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## CONS

- Reopens closed arms flow valve into volatile region.
- Conditions difficult to implement, especially prevention of arms flowing to bordering states; i.e. Tutsi military in Burundi.

b) Pressure GOR to name 400+ most heinous genocide perpetrators/issue warrants for their arrest. Amnesty announced for all other refugees. GOR would commit to ensure security for all returning refugees. (Any future Rwandan amnesty could not affect the jurisdiction of the War Crimes Tribunal established by the Security Council nor our obligation to deport war criminals to stand trial before the Tribunal.)

- Make concerted effort worldwide to apprehend perpetrators by surprise.
- International community would widely publicize names and suspected whereabouts of 400+ genocide perpetrators. Commit to capture, deport/detain all 400+. U.S. and others would mount concerted international campaign (w/newspaper ads, etc.) to shame countries harboring war criminals to turn them over. U.S. would deport suspected criminals in U.S. to the Hague or Rwanda as appropriate.
- International community/UN does all possible to expedite work of War Crimes Tribunal.
- International community redirects funds to reconstruction/capacity-building (as U.S. has already done). Provides substantial financial assistance to provide housing, etc. to returnees.

Note: Could make a) conditional on progress on b).

c) UNHCR announces movement/closure of all refugee camps within 6 months. Phases-down relief operations. Refugees are allowed to return under UN or other international escort or to resettle elsewhere away from border areas.

## PROS

- Closing camps eliminates base of support for extremists who want to wage war.
- Removes most significant current lasting barrier to reconstruction in the region.
- Can more comprehensively address lasting rebuilding needs in the region.

## CONS

- Could trigger ex-FAR attack to further polarize situation and prevent any return.
- Presupposes that refugees want to and/or will return; they cannot be forced.

d) U.S. and others work to enlist help from Mobutu. We urge Mobutu to take immediate steps to halt arms flow in Zaire, allow stationing of monitors at key airports in eastern Zaire and movement of refugee camps inland, use his forces to disarm/close ex-FAR camps in Zaire, put forces on border to prevent/deter ex-FAR incursions. In exchange, international community agrees to help fund Zairian forces, possibly through UNHCR. We continue to urge Mobutu to

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enter dialogue on modalities for internationally-sponsored elections in Zaire. Possibly coordinate with Carter effort.

e) International community intensifies support for current government via "tough love" campaign.

- France provides bilateral assistance
- Europeans invite senior GOR for official visits
- U.S. receives Rwandan leaders at the White House
- International community states it will cut all assistance if GOR refuses to take step b) above, stop detaining alleged criminals, and/or refuse to take steps to release or improve living standards of/try detainees.

**Option #2: Internationally Brokered Settlement:**

Analysis: Try to "put humpty-dumpty together again" by seeking once again a political solution to the problems of Burundi and perhaps Rwanda. In support of this effort, a Bosnian-style Contact Group could be developed to seek a commitment for internationally sustained high-level attention among interested states (i.e., U.S., Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the Vatican and the European Community). Could build on existing Great Lakes regional peace process.

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Effort in Burundi would entail negotiations to establish a confederation of de facto ethnically-segregated provinces unified by a coalition government. Following agreement among the Contact Group, the international community would immediately seek to broker such an agreement and declare its readiness to provide substantial economic assistance to a federal government as an incentive.

If the parties refuse to work toward or reach agreement, the international community would cut all humanitarian and development assistance to Burundi, seek to try the extremists for crimes against humanity, freeze assets, and impose an economic and/or arms embargo. These tough steps would be aimed at weakening the extremists, taking away the resources for which they compete, and stimulating the population to recommit themselves and their leaders to the establishment of a viable national entity.

If the parties agreed to a settlement, active and sustained international stewardship (possibly through interim UN administration as in Cambodia) would be necessary to consolidate the agreement, help keep the peace, train an integrated army, establish an effective, multi-ethnic justice system and a viable police force. As prior steps, the international community must first establish a Commission of Inquiry to look into the October 1993 coup and its aftermath (the UNSC has already started the process to create a Commission), curtail the hate radio believed to be broadcasting out of Uvira, seek to remove extremists like Bagaza and Buyoya from the scene and develop a phased plan for the return of all refugees including those in western Zaire.

Regarding Rwanda, the Contact Group would work to advance reconciliation efforts and try to mediate a resolution with ex-FAR.

PROS

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- Threat of harsh, concerted international action along with risks of continued ethnic conflict, may be sufficient to bring parties to a viable, lasting settlement.
- May be achievable in the relative short term.
- *If implemented swiftly, could forestall/prevent widespread genocide.*
- Allows international community to try one last step short of the use of force to resolve the current crisis.

**CONS**

- International community must reach agreement on outlines of settlement and tough measures to be imposed if settlement fails. Thus far, donors have been able to agree on little with respect to Burundi.
- Chances of success are limited.
- Costly. Would require substantial political/diplomatic, economic and military investment in Burundi. International involvement should be expected to last at least five years.
- Burundi leaders may divide and conquer international community by neither rejecting agreement outright nor negotiating in good faith.


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